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TRADITION, PRINCIPLE AND SELF-SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Robin West*
The "liberty" protected by the United States
Constitution has been variously interpretedas
the "liberty" of thinking persons to speak,
worship and associate with others, unimpeded
by onerous state law; the "liberty" of
consumers and producers to make individual
market choices, including the choice to sell
one's labour at any price one sees fit, free of
redistributive or paternalisticlegislation that
might restrict it; and the liberty of all of us in
the domestic sphere to make choices regarding
reproductive andfamily life, free of state law
that might restrict it on grounds relating to
public morals. Although the United States
Supreme Court has never done so, the same
phrase could also be interpretedas protecting
the positive liberty of individuals to engage in
decent work, to enjoy general physical safety
and welfare, and to bepreparedforthe duties of
citizenship. Such a progressive interpretation,
in fact, might be more in line with the overall
purpose of the ReconstructionAmendments, of
which the right to not be deprived of one's
liberty without due process of law, is a part.

I.

La notion de olibertg qui est proteg&e par la
constitution des Etats-Unis a &9 6 tour de r6le
interprt9e comme 9tant la olibertg)
d'expression,de religion et d 'association,sans
contrainte de cofiteuses lois des ttats; la
alibert&?des consommateurset desproducteurs
de faire des choix de marchi individuels, y
compris le choix de vendre son travail &i
n importe quel prix jug6 appropri6,libre de
lkgislation paternaliste ou de ripartition qui
pourraitlimiter cette activiti;et notre libert6 6
nous tous qui vivons dans cette sphere defaire
des choix relatifs 6 notre vie reproductiveou
familiale, sans contrainte qu 'une loi de I'Etat
puisse limiter ces d~cisionspour des raisonsde
noralepublique.Bien que la Coursuprime des
Etats-Unis ne l'aitjamaisfait, le mime terme
pourrait aussi etre interpr~t9 de mani&re 6
prot~gerla libert positive d 'individusdisirant
faire un travailhonndte,profiterd'une s~eurit
et d 'un bien-itrephysiquesgin&aux et assumer
les responsabilit~sd 'un citoyen. D 'ailleurs,une
telle interpretationprogressivepourraitmieux
s'inscrire dans la raison d'6tre globale des
amendements de reconstitutiondontfait partie
le droit de ne pas tre privg de sa libert sans
application rdguli~rede la loi.

INTRODUCTION

Is individual liberty protected by the United States Constitution? And if so,
of what does it consist? In one sense, the United States Constitution is about
liberty and little else: taken in its entirety, the Constitution aims to ensure the
political liberty of the states to govern free of the encroachments of the federal
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government; it aims to ensure the liberty of the national Congress to act pursuant
to its enumerated powers free of interference by the executive branch (and vice
versa), and at least some of the first ten amendments aim to ensure that the
individual not be deprived by the national and arguably state governments as
well of particular liberties: a state may not, for example, interfere with the
individual's liberty to speak, worship or publish, nor may it deprive him of his
political liberty to vote. It is also clear that several clauses of the Constitution,
but particularly the so-called "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, aim to protect the individual against unjust deprivations of his
liberty of movement without due process of law: neither the state nor the federal
government may arrest, detain and incarcerate individuals indefinitely without
some sort of legal process. Again, several clauses of the Constitution
uncontroversially guarantee such a right.
However, while the Fourteenth Amendment does unambiguously (or at least
uncontroversially) preclude the states from depriving an individual of his or her
life, liberty or property "without due process of law," it is not at all clear whether
this clause or the comparable clause in the Fifth Amendment confers upon the
individual any absolute right to liberty - no matter how liberty might be defined
- beyond the more limited and procedural guarantee that liberty of movement
not be taken away without some sort of "process." Thus, while an individual
surely has a right not to be deprived of her liberty without legal process, it is not
clear that the same clause confers upon the individual any right to liberty that
cannot be infringed by the substance of laws that have no procedural defect. And
again, this is true regardless of the meaning we give the word "liberty." It is
simply not clear, for example, that the individual, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Constitution in its entirety, enjoys a sphere of what Isaiah
Berlin taught us all to call "negative liberty,"' within which he can conduct his
own self-regarding private affairs in any way he sees fit, and within which he can
rest assured that he will be unimpeded by state laws that require him to refrain
from doing what he would otherwise be inclined to do, or to take action which
he would, all things being equal, choose not to take. Nor is it clear whether the
individual, or groups of individuals, enjoy a sphere of "liberty" of the sort
celebrated by Mill: a liberty to try to put into practice various competing
conceptions of the good life, free of paternalistic intervention, and from which
we might all learn, much as we purportedly learn, through federalism, from the

I. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969) 118.
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societal experiments undertaken by our fifty somewhat autonomous states.2 Far
less clear is the constitutional
status of what Berlin called in his famous essay
"positive liberty,"3 or more simply, freedom from unjust oppression, or
subordination: a right to be truly the author of one's own fate. By virtue of the
Thirteenth Amendment, we unambiguously enjoy a right not to be enslaved. But
it is not at all clear that the Fourteenth confers upon us a correlative right to the
kind of liberty Berlin understood as the self-mastery that is slavery's opposite.
And, given that it is not clear whether such an abstract sphere of liberty is
protected in principle, or what its content might be, it is not surprising that every
more specific attempt to implement such a "liberty interest" has also been
plagued with uncertainty. Rather, Supreme Court authority in the liberty cases
tells us little more than how each temporal Court views each contested liberty.
As a result, even the status of the particular liberties on which the Court has
spoken remain unclear. Thus, to take some examples of negative liberty, it is
simply unclear that either the language or history of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or for that matter of the Constitution taken as a whole,
can fairly be read as conferring upon the individual the "liberty," for example,
to freely contract to work for more than a certain number of hours or for less
than a certain wage, free of the interference of state laws limiting this right. In
the first few decades of this century, the Lochner Court4 said it did, but that view
has since then been firmly and repeatedly renounced.' It is also unclear whether
parents have the liberty to send their children to a private school where
instruction is in a language other than English, contrary to a state law requiring
English-only education. The Court in Meyers v. Nebraska6 said they do, and that
result apparently still stands.

2

3
4

5
6

J.S. Mill, "On Liberty" in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on
Representative Government (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1972) 65.
Supra note 1 at 131-44.
InLochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) the Supreme Court held that a state statute
limiting the number of hours worked by bakers violates the guarantee of liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Between 1905 and 1937, the Court invalidated a large number
of state and Congressional enactments under a similar reading of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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It is unclear whether the clause confers upon the individual the "liberty" to
engage in sodomitic sex acts, unburdened by state anti-sodomy laws
criminalizing such behaviour, or a right to marry someone of the same sex free
of laws forbidding such unions. The Rehnquist Court in Bowers v. Hardwick7
said no to the first question and has not spoken to the second, but the result in
Bowers may have been implicitly overturned in the Romer 8 case, in which the
Court found some constitutional protection for gay and lesbian citizens in the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also not clear, from
the text or history, whether the individual enjoys the "liberty" to marry
polygamously, in the face of laws and even state constitutions forbidding it, or
the "liberty" to engage in adultery, fornication or adult incest free of laws
criminalizing such conduct. No Court has ever held that she does. Similarly, it
is not clear whether an individual has the freedom to use contraceptives or seek
an abortion, free of laws forbidding those interferences with reproduction, or a
right to kill herself with or without the aid of the doctor should she find herself
terminally ill and in unbearable pain, free of laws forbidding suicide. The Court
revisits the abortion decision almost every term, but the law is still radically
uncertain. The best that can be said is that women do enjoy some right to an
abortion before viability, but it is no longer the case that that right is
"fundamental," or that state laws restricting it are to be subject to "strict
scrutiny."9
The Court has recently held that one state's ban on physician-assisted suicide
was constitutional,' ° thus casting some doubt on the existence of a so-called
"right to die," but it fell far short of unambiguously affirming or denying the
existence of such a right. What the Court has never managed to do, however, is
to articulate an overarching rationale or principle for any of these so-called
"negative liberty" cases. As a consequence, even the results of many of the
decided cases are not terribly secure, and the meaning and scope of virtually all
of them is not clear. Again, after more than a hundred years of discourse, it
remains radically uncertain, from either the text or history orjudicial precedent,
whether the Constitution, and more specifically the Fourteenth Amendment,
confers upon the individual a sphere of negative liberty or freedom within which
he or she is free to form an autonomous life unimpeded by the substantive
constraints that may be imposed upon that life by the power of state law.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9
PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
10 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
7
8
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The status of claims to "positive liberty" are, if anything, even less clear. It
is not at all clear from either the text or the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
that the individual has a right to be free of the oppressive burden of private
violence, even if that violence is unchecked, unregulated and undeterred by the
state. A fear of undeterred private violence may well leave the victimized
individual with substantially less positive freedom than he would have without
it - such an individual is far less the "author of his own fate" than one who is
free or unimpeded by such threats. But there is surely no consensus - in fact
there is little more than a whisper of a suggestion from commentators - that the
individual enjoys, through the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty,"
the right to be free of such a burden. The Supreme Court, furthermore, has never
so held, and in fact has recently stated, albeit in dicta, very much to the contrary,
that there is no constitutional right to a police force."' There is similarly no
consensus - again, little more than the barest whisper on the part of
commentators, and absolutely no Supreme Court support - that the individual
has the right to be free of the threat of severe material deprivation, or the right
to full employment. Severe material deprivation, as well as chronic
unemployment, also interfere, and mightily, with the individual's enjoyment of
positive liberty; with his or her ability to master his own fate, to author his own
destiny and to be a slave to no one. But there is little support from commentators
and virtually no support from this Court or any prior that the Constitution,
through the due process clause, protects the individual "positive liberty" to be
free of such burdens.
More generally, it is not at all clear that the individual enjoys what could best
be construed as a constitutionally bestowed right to be positively free of the
oppressive or subordinating actions of private actors, whether they be
exploitative employers who refuse to pay a living wage, racist hate groups
burning crosses, or abusive spouses, and regardless of whether the resulting
oppression comes to be so severe as to resemble the status of enslavement.
Again, commentators have only rarely suggested that such an interpretation of
the Constitution might be a fair one, and the Court has held, in a solid line of
cases dating from the reconstruction era, 2 squarely against it: the Constitution
speaks only to the actions of states and state actors, and neither to the actions of
private parties nor to the inaction of states in their failure to respond to those
private acts.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County DepartmentofSocialServices, 489 U.S. 189, 196-97

(1989).
12

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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This alone presents a puzzle. Why has there been so little clear guidance by
the Court, and so little by way of suggestion from commentators, on the meaning
of the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of protecting
either the negative or positive liberty of individuals against acts of oppression
from others, whether the "others" be states or other entities? To bring the issue
quickly into focus, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whose language is at least as opaque as the liberty clause - has been the vehicle
for dramatic transformations of American culture and the subject of countless
interpretative exercises by commentators, many of them radically utopian. " The
liberty clause, by contrast, has yielded little fruit. In a society so unambiguously
and overwhelmingly committed, at the rhetorical level, to "liberty," and so
seemingly hostile, for most of its history, to claims of "equality," this seems,
simply, odd. The clause that expressly guarantees liberty has provided precious
little of it, beyond guarantees of process. Nor has it served well as aspiration:
neither commentators nor political activists have made much rhetorical use of
it toward the end of expanding our popular understanding of the liberty to which
we are entitled.
To be sure, and as suggested above, the Supreme Court has, from time to
time in our history, used the "due process" guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect a sphere of "liberty" that goes beyond the mere protection
of procedural rights. It uses it today as well, primarily to protect the "liberty" of
men and women to use contraception, and of women to obtain previability
abortions free of the criminalization of such procedures by states. That history,
however, far from providing either a starting point of analysis for greater
elaboration of the underlying norm, or even inspiration for its future
development, provides at least part of the explanation for the lack of it. The
history of the Court's use of the due process clause toward the end of protecting
so-called "substantive" liberty is a profoundly ignoble one, and that fact alone
may act as a serious drag on contemporary development of the doctrine.

13

P. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1991); C. MacKinnon, "Reflections on Sex Equality under Law" (1991) 100
Yale L.J. 1281; 0. Fiss, "Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth Anniversary of
the Harvard Law Review: Why the State?" (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781; R. Colker,
"Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection" (1986) 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1003.

2002
Revue d'6tudes constitutionnelles
HeinOnline -- 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 267 2001-2002

268

Robin West

First, in the middle of the nineteenth century a slaveholder in the infamous
Dred Scott case 4 essentially argued, and successfully, that the analogous Fifth
Amendment "due process clause" protected his property interest in slaves and
his liberty to own them, free of interference by the national government. Civil
war was the consequence of this earliest invocation by the Supreme Court of an
individual's constitutionally protected "liberty" against laws which seemingly
constrained it. More recently, in the first three decades of the past century, the
Court accepted the argument of employers and propertied classes that the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protected the individual's
substantive "liberty" to freely contract for labour unburdened by redistributive
or paternalistic state or national legislation that limited it. 5 Thus, it was
individual freedom or liberty, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, that
served as the vehicle during the first three decades of the past century for the
constitutional voidance of scores of legislative attempts by both states and
Congress to ameliorate the harshness of markets in times of severe economic
distress. That use of the "substantive due process" clause as well is now
universally renounced. The DredScott decision, of course, was overturned by a
war, and the Lochner case and its progeny by a series ofjudicial decisions in the
late 1930s and 1940s, but both Dred Scott and the Lochner era left their mark.
Any contemporary attempt to breathe life into the "substantive due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or even into the very idea that the
Fourteenth Amendment should protect some degree of individual liberty against
pernicious legislation, is heavily burdened by this historical record: the two
clearest examples of attempts by the Court to do precisely that constituted
unambiguous moral monstrosities. Both in DredScott and in Lochner the Court
protected the substantive negative liberty of "individuals" - in the first case, the
negative liberty to own slaves and in the second the negative liberty to contract
and in both cases the Court wreaked havoc upon the nation by so doing.
In modern times, as noted, the Court has "revived" the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment from the supposed beating it took during the retreat
from Lochner, and has employed it once again toward the end of protecting
liberty: this time, not the liberty of employers and employees to contract free of
paternalistic and redistributive legislation constraining it but the individual
liberty of men and women to use birth control,16 and of individual women to

14
15

16

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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procure abortions free of "moralistic" legislation forbidding those sales."7 This
modem "revival" of substantive due process toward the end of protecting
"personal" rather than "economic" liberty, however, has done little to rehabilitate
the concept of "liberty," or our understanding of its relation to other
constitutional goals. Rather, the protection of abortion and contraceptive use
through the due process clause has proven to be extraordinarily controversial,
and left the Court open to the charge of hypocrisy: why is it, after all, that the
"liberty" to procure an abortion is to be protected, but the "liberty" to work for
less than the minimum wage not only unprotected but vilified?
In part, of course, the controversy over Roe v. Wade and its progeny is
entirely a function of the nature of the abortion debate itself: for some, abortion
is a cornerstone of individual freedom and women's equality, but for others it is
the unjustified destruction of human life. Given that fact, decisionmaking
surrounding abortion at any level - the individual's decision to procure one, the
locality's attempt to regulate it, the state's attempt to criminalize it, Congress's
attempt to provide funding for it or its adamant refusal to do so, and the Court's
attempt to constitutionally protect it - is guaranteed to prove divisive. But at
least in equal measure, the contemporary debate within legal circles about the
protection of the right to obtain an abortion established by Roe v. Wade and then
redefined in Casey, is a debate over the wisdom of protecting individual liberty
-

no matter what its content -

through the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Simply put, if the Lochner reasoning was so
abominable, it's not clear how Roe can be so right. Again, neither Lochner, nor
its repudiation, nor Roe, rest on a clear and clearly stated principle of
constitutional law. It remains simply unclear - as a matter of text, of history, or
for that matter of political theory - whether the Constitution does or should
protect a sphere of individual liberty, no matter how defined, and no matter
whether it does or doesn't include a right to obtain an abortion, against state
encroachment. To the extent that the debates surrounding Roe and Casey can be
traced to underlying debates regarding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,
then it is fair to say that the so-called "abortion wars" have been fuelled by two
seemingly unrelated open questions of constitutional jurisprudence: whether
there is any protected sphere of individual liberty, and how we should go about
defining its content.

17

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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In the sections below, I will take up various attempts to define the content of
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But first, one must ask the
more basic question, and that is whether there is any such protected sphere.
Justice O'Connor, speaking for a divided Court in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,
stated unequivocally that the answer is yes: the Supreme Court, she argued, has
never read the liberty phrase of the due process clause as having no substantive
content.18 Therefore, she concluded, the only fair question goes to its content, not
its existence. Nevertheless, O'Connor J., and the Court, might be wrong. There
are sound reasons, some grounded in constitutional methodology, others in
political theory and others simply in politics, for resisting O'Connor J.'s
conclusion, and it's worth at least enumerating what those reasons might be.
IS LIBERTY CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT?

II.

First, the grammar and language of the text seem at best ambiguous with
regard to the general claim that the Constitution protects individual liberty, if not
hostile to such an outcome. The Fourteenth Amendment by its language
unambiguously precludes the state from depriving someone of their liberty
without due process of law, but simply does not explicitly provide for any more
absolute right. And, as countless commentators have pointed out, 19 the text is
utterly devoid of reference to any of the more particular liberties that have been
urged under the general concept: there is no mention anywhere in the
Constitution of the trimesters of a pregnancy, the point ofviability, contraceptive
devices, sodomitic acts, assisted suicide, home- or private-schooling, or yellow
dog contracts. The history of the passage of the Amendment as well, at least
according to the commentators that have investigated it, yields surprisingly little
- again, to draw a contrast, there is much less documentation of what the
reconstruction congress intended, than is the case regarding the equal protection
clause.2°

18
19

20

Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,834 (1992).
PlannedParenthoodofSoutheastern
J. Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade" (1973) 82 Yale
L.J. 920; R. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law (New
York: Free Press, 1990) 111-17.
For an attempt to provide a robust interpretation of a relatively meagre historical record,
see C. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1995).
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But perhaps most important, the precedential history of the clause, as
suggested above, is disheartening. Surely, if the history of Dred Scott and
Lochner teach us anything at all, it is that at least two out of three of the
historical attempts by the Court to carve out such a sphere have been spectacular
moral disasters (the third, of course, being the modem reproductive rights cases),
and furthermore, disasters of a particular sort: individual liberty, judicially
defined by unelected, nonrepresentative judges drawn from the elite classes, was
won through the exploitation first of slaves and then workers, and through the
process of invalidating democratically drawn legislation designed to ease or
eliminate those oppressions. Dred Scott and Lochner both present the unseemly
and grotesque picture of unelected judges protecting economic privilege by
ruling legislation passed by the somewhat more representative branches
unconstitutional - legislation that in both cases was aimed at alleviating the
plight of subordinate classes.
Thus, it is not only advocates of judicial restraint who have urged that the
Court should refrain from aggressively or ambitiously reading into the
Fourteenth Amendment a dollop of individual liberty. Leftists and progressives
have also expressed concern, and even alarm, at the prospect of doing so.
Individual liberty does, at least much of the time, seem to come with a cost:
sometimes to equality, sometimes to community and sometimes simply to
civility. The individual's "liberty," after all, is virtually by definition the liberty
to exercise, exploit or exert one's own forces -

one's own advantages -

upon

the social and natural world, with the fully intended and invariable consequence
being that that exertion will be felt by the world in an "unequal" way. Otherwise,
it will hardly bear the mark of one's individual effort. The consequence of this
freeing of individual exertion, energy and advantage is, oftentimes, a serious
threat to egalitarian goals. The celebrated "liberty" of the powerful, economically
advantaged individual, for example, is at times nothing but the liberty to amass
wealth through the concentrated, unimpeded and unregulated acquisition of
surplus labour value. The liberty of even the economically disempowered but
racially or sexually privileged individual may mean little more than the liberty
to express hate through symbolic or real acts of violence, or the liberty to profit
through the pomographing or prostituting of women's bodies.
The other side of the coin is equally troubling: the "liberty" of the lesspowerful, less-advantaged individual is at least on occasion nothing but the
obfuscating and legitimating freedom to participate consensually in practices that
clearly harm her, while profiting others: the liberty to prostitute oneself, to sign
a yellow dog contract or to sell one's reproductive services as a "surrogate"
mother. These "liberties" of the weak to freely engage in their own exploitation
2002
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might be best understood as examples of what Professor Corea has provocatively
called "junk liberty": such liberty being to the real thing what junk food is to real
nutrition. 2' The conclusion to be drawn from progressive suspicion is clear
enough, and is simply a word of caution: constitutionalizing individual liberty,
particularly in a legal and social culture that refuses to "constitutionalize" any
but a formal entitlement to equality, runs the serious risk of skewing our
fundamental political and moral commitments in a seriously regressive direction.
On the other hand, it seems to many - particularly to liberals and
libertarians - almost inconceivable that the United States Constitution does not
in some way protect individual liberty against unreasonable or overly intrusive
state and national lawmaking. For this group - which today includes a majority
of the Supreme Court - protection of some measure of at least negative liberty
is logically mandated by the structure of the Constitution, and by the moral and
political truths on which it rests. How could the Constitution possibly not protect
self-regarding acts that do no discernible harm to others? The question seems to
answer itself. We protect speech and thought, all toward the end of widening the
sphere of individual autonomy; there simply is no principled distinction, in this
context, between speech-acts and other acts that are of equal consequence to the
individual and his self-definition, and of equal irrelevance to the legitimate
interests of others. Furthermore, that the constitutional text speaks only
ambiguously of the general right, and is silent on its more specific entailments,
says nothing: the Constitution does not make explicit reference to exclusionary
rules, to three-part "Lemon" tests regarding Church and State claims, 22 to "strict
scrutiny," rational basis or intermediate review regarding equal protection
claims. The word "equality," after all, unlike the word "liberty," does not even
appear in the Constitution. That articulation of a liberty-based jurisprudence
requires of the Court that it actively probe the moral and political implications
of our commitment to an amorphous concept does not count against the necessity
or desirability of the enterprise. Nor does it differentiate it from any other field
of constitutional jurisprudence.
To this group, the progressive and leftist objections to the project of
constitutionalizing liberty count for even less. For libertarian defenders of
liberty, ofcourse, the tension between individualist and egalitarian goals is a plus

21

G. Corea, "Junk Liberty" in D. Kelly Weisberg, ed., Applications of Feminist Legal

22

Theory to Women 's Lives: Sex, Violence, Work and Reproduction (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1996) 1112 at 1112-14.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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rather than a minus: that constitutionalizing liberty might come at the cost of
gains in substantive equality is not something to worry over, it is something to
expect and even value. Liberty just is inegalitarian, and a commitment to one is
a commitment to the other. For other and more liberal (rather than libertarian)
defenders of liberty, the apparent tension or conflict between liberty and equality
is, first of all, by no means necessary and might be more apparent than real. If
understood as a guarantee of positive liberty, of course, the tension disappears
altogether: positive liberty is as conducive to equality as negative liberty is
hostile. But even if limited to negative liberties, the relation between liberty and
equality is not necessarily the one-way street a too-quick reading of our history
might suggest: protection of individual liberty should, in general, protect attacks
on the citadel of privilege no less than the privilege itself. A protection of
negative liberty should, for example, protect the acts as well as the speech of the
labour organizer no less than the contractual act and speech of the employer. It
should protect the anarchist, agitator, organizer and social critic no less than the
media mogul. It should protect the drop-out no less than the successful
entrepreneur.
But in another sense, again from a liberal perspective, progressive objections
to liberty are as oddly beside the point as are economic-conservative and
libertarian celebrations of it. Liberty, at least for some liberals, should best be
understood as a political ideal in service of neither regressive nor progressive
economic ends. At least for some, the protection of or guarantee of liberty should
be in service of, in essence, a sphere of anarchy: a sphere of creative chaos neither egalitarian nor hierarchic- within an otherwise structured constitutional
order. What a constitutional right of individual liberty would protect, ideally and
in its essence, would be neither the rights of privilege nor the forces of progress,
but the powers of nonconformity. On this vision, it is the true, hard-core,
eccentric nonconformist - the Timothy Learies, the Noam Chomskys, the
Adrienne Riches, the Gordon Liddys, the Camille Paglias, the Margaret Sangers,
the Ken Keseys, the Molly Ivenses - and not the business tycoon or the labour
organizer, who should be the beneficiary of an expansive conception of
substantive liberty, and the character toward whom the promise of liberty should
be aimed. On this vision, again, whether such protection serves progressive or
regressive ends is not wholly irrelevant, perhaps, but nor should it be
determinative of the scope of that protected sphere, and certainly not of its
existence.
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On the other hand, there is no necessary reason to think that an anarchic
understanding of liberty would serve regressive ends, and some reason to think
it would not: if it is the nonconformist, rather than the enterprising business
tycoon, who is going to be the real beneficiary of an expansive, liberal
understanding of liberty, that nonconformist - the man who chooses a same-sex
partner in marriage, the woman who chooses to control rather than to acquiesce
in her natural reproductive cycles, or the dying patient who chooses to acquiesce
in a natural order rather than be lured by the false promise of empowerment and
control offered by medical interventions - is, after all, at least as likely to
express a meaningful challenge to the status quo, as to legitimize through his
individualistic inclinations a world which does little but relentlessly reward
aggression against others in the guise of liberty, and maybe more so. At any rate,
the quintessential promise of liberty, for the liberal, is certainly not the liberty to
exploit the weakness of others, or excel in various markets, any more than it is
to organize the weak against the strong. It is, rather, quintessentially the liberty
to dissent: to live one's life in defiance or disregard of the socially mandated
order of things, whether that defiance or disregard is prompted by eccentricity,
genius, obstinacy or sociopathology, and whether it promises an improved order,
a regression or nothing but a measure of chaos. It is toward the protection of that
potential for chaos that the liberal hopes to pit constitutional guarantees.
III.

THE CONTENT OF LIBERTY

If we assume arguendo that the Fourteenth Amendment provides some
protection of individual liberty beyond a guarantee of due process, of what does
that liberty consist? One can discern, I think, at least four quite different answers
to that question, reflecting four contrasting political and moral orientations
toward constitutional law. Two of those four, and the first two I shall discuss,
constitute the poles of internal constitutional discourse: they can be found within
the case-law as well as within constitutional commentary. The second two I will
discuss come from outside traditional constitutional canonical sources, but have
nonetheless played a role in the development of constitutional principles.
A. Traditionalism
The first possible response, ardently argued by Scalia J. and somewhat less
fervently by Rehnquist C.J., is that the substantive due process clause protects,
if anything, the liberty of the individual to engage in practices sanctified by
historical, cultural traditions, that might from time to time be challenged by
pernicious, ill-conceived, mendacious, envy-driven or simply precipitous if not
promiscuous legislative whims of the elected representative branches. The
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Constitution in its entirety, and the due process clause specifically, aims, on this
view, to conserve social tradition against democratic change. The liberty the
individual has that is worth protecting against democracy, then, is simply the
"liberty" to engage in these traditions. Justice Scalia first articulated this
understanding of due process in a footnote in Michael H. v. GeraldD.,23 a case
in which a biological father had unsuccessfully sought to assert a due process
liberty interest in his relationship with his biological son, against the force of a
state law that conclusively presumed the paternity of the marital husband at the
time of the child's birth against all subsequent challengers. In denying the claim,
Scalia J. explained that as there was no tradition of protecting such biological
familial relationships, and indeed a good deal of tradition on the other side, there
was no "liberty" of the individual's that could
or should be protected. In a long
24
reasoning:
his
on
footnote, he elaborated
[In deciding whether a practice is a protected liberty] [w]e refer to the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified. If ... there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the

natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (ifpossible)
reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general. But there is such a more
specific tradition, and it unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent ... Because ...
general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather
than discern the society's views. ... Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of
leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law
that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.

What "tradition," and what individual liberty to engage in it, might meet such
a test? And what conceivable tradition, and individual liberty to engage in it,
might ever be threatened by legislation, that does, after all, as Brennan J.
complained,25 typically restate and bolster, rather than buck, societal tradition?
Is there any specific, particular tradition that might on occasion be so threatened
by legislation, that the Court would be justified, on Scalia J.'s criteria, in voiding
legislation so as to protect the tradition? The obvious contender is simply the
traditional nuclear family, and the cluster ofpractices, rites, rituals and privileges
it embraces. Consider, for example, this admittedly far-fetched hypothetical: a
state legislature, in a fit of whimsy, political correctness or religion-baiting,
momentarily loses its collective good sense and passes a law outlawing the entire
institution, or at least removing the state from its operations. Clearly, the then
threatened "tradition" of state-sanctioned marriage, on Scalia J.'s test, might

23

24

25

491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Ibid. at 127-28, n. 6.
Ibid. at 137-41.
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bestow upon individuals who wish to participate in it a "liberty" worth
protecting, constitutionally, against this ill-conceived legislative assault.
Whatever might be the case regarding other "traditions" of our collective past,
if any are to receive constitutional protection against legislative change or
abolishment, surely this tradition is one that should.2 6 The family, after all, is
older than the state, is arguably more basic to civic society and in this
hypothetical state is more embattled. Should a state join those cultural forces
trying to weaken it, surely an entirely proper role of the Constitution, and of the
unelected judges who are charged with the duty of upholding it, is to protect it
and the liberty of individuals to engage in it against such challenges.
Whatever might be the merits of this traditionalist approach to the content
of substantive due process, the Court itself has only fitfully adhered to it and,
outside the context of marriage and family, never unambiguously embraced it.
Oddly, Scalia J., its firmest advocate, declined a recent opportunity to endorse
and expand upon it. In Romer,27 after all, the citizens of Colorado voted to use
their state Constitution to state explicitly what is only implicitly guaranteed, on
this view, in the federal Constitution: that the traditional, nuclear, heterosexual
family needs protection against democratically approved ordinances that
effectively weaken the tradition by sanctioning radically divergent alternatives
to it. On a traditionalist approach to the Constitution, and to liberty, not only
should "Amendment Two" have been found to not violate federal constitutional
norms, but on the contrary it should have been applauded for doing explicitly
what the federal government does only implicitly: aligning the Constitution, and
the idea of constitutionalism with a beleaguered tradition against precipitous and
ill-thought change. Justice Scalia, however, certainly the most forceful
spokesperson for a traditionalist approach to liberty, did not defend the
Amendment on this ground; he instead argued far more conventionally that the
Amendment was constitutionally permissible (rather than laudatory), and on the
utterly conventional and nontraditionalist grounds that to state otherwise would
constitute a departure from norms of neutrality. Perhaps not too much can be
read into this pregnant negative: because of the odd way in which the question
arose, the case did not, after all, directly pose the question whether an individual
has a constitutionally protected liberty to the preservation of the traditional
nuclear family. Nevertheless, that Scalia J.'s defence of the constitutionality of
the Coloradan constitutional amendment made no reference to his own
traditionalist conception of constitutionalism is at least worthy of mention.

26
27

See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Should the Court ever embrace a traditionalist approach to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Romer case as well as the
"Preservation of Marriage Act" passed by Congress make vividly clear what at
least some of the problems with such an approach might be. First, of course, a
traditionalist reading renders the clause almost a dead letter - which may of
course be a fully intended result. Neither state legislatures nor Congress are
particularly hell-bent on the destruction oftime-honoured traditions; for the most
part, laws do indeed reflect and enforce rather than defy tradition. To
characterize "liberty" as consisting ofthe individual freedom to behave in a hidebound traditional way in the face of legislative encouragement to behave nontraditionally is not only perverse, but generally pointless. Whatever it is that
induces in us an inclination toward conformity, it seems to be shared in large
measure with whatever it is that drives legislation. And neither force seems to
have much to do with what we have come to call liberty.
But second, if the inclination to define and confine the due process clause by
reference to "tradition" is driven by an urge to render the meaning of the clause
definite - and to thereby hem in the discretion of the federal judiciary - its
proponents would undoubtedly be disappointed should such a reading ever
prevail. Justice Scalia's adamant insistence to the contrary in his dissent in Casey
notwithstanding, "traditions" are not "facts" - or at least, they are no more facts
than are the liberal, ideal principles of autonomy to which the conservative
Justice wishes to contrast them. The marriage and gay rights cases demonstrate
the point. No legislature is going to do something so bizarre as to revoke
wholesale the privilege to marry. But a legislature well might expand the
privilege of marriage so that it also covers individuals who want to marry
someone of the same sex. Another might someday wish to expand it so that it
covers individuals who want to marry more than one person at a time, or expand
it so that it covers individuals below the present age of consent. In all of these
cases, whether the legislation in question destroys, strengthens or is utterly
neutral toward the "tradition of marriage" is an entirely contingent, and
contestable question: it obviously depends upon how we define the tradition, and
it just as obviously won't do to define the tradition by reference to extant law
when the law is in transition. Whether gay marriage is hostile to the tradition of
marriage depends upon whether heterosexual coupling is necessary to it or isn't;
whether loving, committed intimacy is the central point of marriage or isn't;
whether consensual contracting is at its heart or isn't; or whether the nuclear
family with dual parenting by biologically connected parents is central to it or
isn't. None of these are obviously correct or incorrect accounts of the "tradition"
of marriage. Before we can decide whether or not our liberty to participate in
traditions has been threatened by some legislative encroachment, we must have
2002
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some sense of what those traditions are. That is not going to be an easy task, and
it will certainly prove no more "definite" an inquiry than the so-deplored, openended inquiries into our "principles" that it is intended to replace.
B. Precedent
The second possible way to define the content of our liberty protected against
legislative encroachment might be called "precedential" or "principled," to
distinguish it from the traditionalist account described above. On this account,
embraced most explicitly by Brennan J., but with its most recent defence that of
O'Connor J.'s opinion for the Court in Casey,28 the liberty protected by the due
process clause is the liberty to engage in those modes of conduct analogous to
practices that the Court has, in prior and not-yet-overturned case-law, explicitly
protected. This account, like the traditionalist, gives not so much an answer to
the question "what liberties are to be protected," but instead, a roadmap to
answering the question. Instead of pointing toward societal tradition, however,
the interpreter is pointed toward judicial precedent. If behaviour can be
analogized to behaviour already protected by precedent, then one has a liberty
to engage in it free of state interference.
Thus, to take some examples, to decide, as the Warren Court had to, whether
a married couple has the right to take birth control in the face of state laws
criminalizing such a practice, the Court had to decide whether that practice was
or wasn't sufficiently similar to earlier practices regarding home and hearth that
had already received protection, such as the decision to home-school one's
children, or to decide in what language one's children should be taught. The
Court in Griswold29 decided it was sufficiently similar and accordingly struck the
law. To decide whether an individual has the right to contraception, the Court
next had to decide whether that decision was or wasn't sufficiently similar to the
now-protected practice of contraception use by married couples. It decided it
was.30 Several years later, to decide whether a woman has the right to obtain an
abortion, the Berger Court had to decide whether that practice was or wasn't
sufficiently similar to the practice of using contraception.3 (It is.) A decade later,
to decide whether an individual has the right to engage in sodomitic sex acts in
the face of state laws criminalizing such conduct, the Rehnquist Court had to

28
29
30

31

505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Supra note 17.
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decide whether that practice was or wasn't sufficiently similar to the practice of
using contraceptions or procuring abortions. (It isn't.)32 To decide whether an
individual has the right to marry someone of a different race, the Court had to
decide whether such a practice is sufficiently similar to earlier protected
practices. (It is.) To decide whether an individual has the right to marry someone
of the same sex or to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician, the
Court will someday have to decide likewise.
There are many difficulties with this precedential approach to liberty, even
if we leave aside its obvious and much commented upon indeterminacy, not the
least of which is that, as Scalia J. rightly complained in his masterful dissent in
Casey, it does indeed smack of realpolitik.33 The liberty of the individual, on
this understanding, is defined by reference to the past political successes of the
Court - not by reference to ideals, the framers' intent and societal traditions, all
of which seem like more solid foundations upon which to rest decisions
invalidating democratically derived legislative results. This seems neither
reasoned, rational nor principled. It resembles more than anything the "follow34
the leader" mentality of the common law courts so derided by Justice Holmes:
surely, as he thought, there must be a better reason to follow a rule of law than
that it was so laid down during the reign of Henry IV or Earl Warren. And
surely, there must be a better reason to protect women's access to abortion
services, protect the liberty of the dying or allow men and women to marry
partners of the same sex than that those practices resemble practices protected
by earlier courts. If there's not, we do indeed need to rethink the liberty at stake.
Second, the precedential approach to the content of liberty forces upon the
advocate what I have elsewhere called a "discourse of sameness" 3 that carries
a very real danger of false generality. In the quest to render the litigated practice
a protected "liberty," the advocate, and then the Court, must stress the similarity
of that practice to a past practice - and in so doing will often elide very real
differences. Virtually all of the cases in the so-called modem due process revival
illustrate the point. The practice of taking birth control, for example, is about as
different as the practice of deciding to send one's children to private schools, or
teach them in a language other than English, as two practices can be. Protecting
32
33
34

3'

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
505 U.S. 833, 998 (Scalia J., dissenting).
O.W. Holmes, "The Path of the Law" quoted in M. Lerner, ed., The Mind and Faith of
Justice Holmes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943) 83.

R. West, "Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's
Law" (1997) 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1313.
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the decisions of the parents regarding their children's education aims to protect,
insulate and thereby strengthen the parent-child family unit. By contrast, it is
almost oxymoronic to suggest that protecting the decision of even married
couples, but surely of single individuals, to have sex free of reproductive
consequences aims to strengthen the family. In fact, it is fair to characterize the
entire societal revolution sparked by technological advances in birth control as
aimed at severing,rather than strengthening the connection between heterosexual
practices and familial responsibilities and ties. The decision to use birth control,
for many, is the very antithesis of the sort of decision the Court characterized as
paradigmatic to both practices: the decision to participate in family life in a
carefully deliberated, responsible fashion. The decision of the individual to
contracept nonmarital intercourse, perhaps not for all but certainly for many, is
driven by a desire to maximize, not minimize, the distance between sexual
activity and family life. The claims to the contrary in Griswold and Eisenstadt
- that the decision to use birth control is more like than unlike the decisions of
parents regarding their children's education - particularly given our current
understanding of the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s, just seem flatly bizarre.
Let me take the question of gay marriage as a final example. Although this
has not yet crystallized into a liberty-based constitutional challenge, it is easy
enough to see how the argument might proceed: just as, as was unsuccessfully
argued in Bowers, gay sex is enough "like" straight sex such that the criminal
prohibition of the former should be regarded as unconstitutional, so gay
marriage, one might argue, is enough "like" traditional marriage so as to bring
the former practice under the umbrella of a protected liberty. In other words, the
argument that the individual's liberty to engage in sodomitic acts, or to enter into
a marriage with a partner of the same sex, ought be constitutionally protected
requires, on this understanding of due process, that there be in effect no salient
difference, and many significant points of similarity, between gay and straight
sex and between gay and heterosexual marriage. It may well be, of course, that
there are many similarities. But it is also true that there are salient differences.
My critical point here is simply that the "discourse of sameness" that a
precedential approach to liberty requires, either diverts us from the work of
exploring those differences and their meaning, or worse, inclines us to deny their
reality.
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Some of those differences, of course, the advocate of gay marriage may be
inclined to deny or mute for purely strategic or political reasons. But others are
differences we should be celebrating, or at least, differences we should explore.
Let me just mention two. First, as I have argued at some length elsewhere, and
will only mention here, lesbian and gay marriage, as an institution, would be
entirely free of the crippling history of mandatory, nonconsensual "marital rape"
that has for most of our history made heterosexual marriage a barrier to, rather
than a safe haven for, women's autonomy and equality.36 Lesbians and gays
entering marriage would not enter it with the expectation that one partner has a
legal entitlement to the sexual services of the other regardless of the other's
desires, and hence would not enter it with the expectation of dominance and
submission that still define, for many, the contemporary reality, as well as the
sorry history, of our heterosexual marital institutions.
Second, lesbian and gay marriage would have at its heart, as conservatives
tirelessly remind us, sexual and affective acts which are through and through
non-reproductive. The moral and social consequences of this difference are of
course open to question, including whether are not there would be any of any
import. But it is a question we ought to leave open, and not close by the
question-begging route of asserting a natural sameness where there is not one,
particularly where, as here, the particular difference is one that might bring a
moral improvement, rather than detriment, to our public lives. The nonreproductive sexual act, at its best, when engaged in by partners in a committed
and loving relationship is an affective and deeply moral gesture of caring,and
when it is directed toward someone with whom one will never pool one's genetic
endowments, and precisely because it is not potentially reproductive, it is,
arguably, a less selfish, rather than a more selfish, act. Were we to change our
conception of marriage so that it included, rather than excluded, couples whose
relationships were consummated by such intimate, loving and moral acts of care,
not only our institution of marriage but our understanding of the connection
between acts of care and relationships of commitment, between being thou- and
I-centred, between attending to another and replicating oneself in another, might
change and improve, as well. Let me stress: whether or not this moral
reorientation might happen is pure speculation. But a discourse that commits us
solely and monotonously to stressing sameness and similarities will by definition
blind us to possibilities of growth - possibilities that might enhance our lives,
and which a frank and careful inquiry into the differences among us might
highlight.

36
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C. Self-Regarding Conduct

The third possible meaning of the liberty protected by the due process clause
is unabashedly liberal, and can be drawn directly from Mill's famous essay: the
individual is entitled to the liberty to act in any way he or she sees fit so long as
those actions cause no harm to others. It is never sufficient grounds for
prohibiting behaviour that the behaviour in question might harm the actor
himself. Nor is it sufficient grounds that the legislature or the public view the
behaviour in question as immoral. Should this understanding of liberty be
embraced by the Court, as Ronald Dworkin has urged,37 some of the more
difficult due process cases would be readily resolved: Bowers itself, from this
liberal, antipaternalistic perspective, appears to be unambiguously
unconstitutional, as do various laws prohibiting doctor-assisted suicide of dying
patients. Laws prohibiting gay marriage would have to be sustained, if at all,
solely on the grounds of as-yet-unproven claims about the threat of gay sex to the
stability of the institution of marriage.
Whether or not paternalistic or moralistic legislation is justified is a very old
question that I won't revisit here beyond just three quick and critical
observations. First, outside of the area of gay politics, the relevance of such a
limiting principle seems to be dwindling. There aren't that many examples of
purely self-regarding conduct and, correlatively, there aren't that many examples
of unambiguously moralistic legislation that can't be justified by reference to
something other than purely moralistic arguments. Motorcycle helmet laws, for
example, are not really "paternalistic" in any but a formal sense; the reduction
in traffic fatality rates saves insurance premium payers as well as taxpayers
substantial dollars. Even the much maligned "war on drugs," if it is foolish,
surely isn't foolish because it targets self-regarding behaviour; as any relative,
friend or child of a drug addict knows, "recreational drug use" profoundly affects
both the user's intimate and farther-flung community.

37

See R. Dworkin, "Liberty and Moralism" in Taking Rights Seriously (Bristol:
Duckworth, 1977) 240; and R. Dworkin, Freedom'sLaw (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1996).
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Second, protecting even purely self-regarding but destructive behaviour by
reference to our now time-honoured "right to be left alone" and our smug if not
juvenile insistence that we always know what's best for us, runs serious risks of
what the critical scholars have for some time now called "legitimation"
problems:38 our right to engage in consensual, self-regarding behaviour free of
the paternalistic judgments of others tends to "legitimate" both in the actor's
mind and in others whatever real harms those behaviours may in fact cause. That
we have a negative liberty right to prostitute ourselves, for example, free of the
paternalistic authority criminalizing that behaviour, may do little for the cause
of freedom but much toward the end of legitimizing the oppressions within
economic markets and sexual relations both: the consensual trade, by virtue of
its consensuality, does tend to mask or at least divert our attention from the quite
real harms those trades may be doing even the consenting partners, much less the
rest of us. Similarly that we are given a right to kill ourselves may in the end do
very little to further our freedom, but much to obfuscate our lack of a right to
health care.
And third, even within the arena of gay politics, it's not clear that what is
gained - the liberty to engage in self-regarding "victimless" conduct free of the
censorial voice of the community - is worth either what is implicitly conceded
by it, or what is lost, in opportunity costs. What is conceded, in this case, as in
all cases in which a negative liberty right is urged to engage in conduct judged
by the community as immoral, is, precisely, the immorality of the conduct.
Liberty rights are only needed, and only asserted, where the community
condemns the behaviour. The argument that we should be free to engage in the
conduct free of the condemnation does nothing to challenge the grounds for the
condemnation itself. Both that implicit concession, and the opportunity-cost it
implies - the opportunity to engage conservative arguments against
homosexuality on their own terms - ought give us pause.
The case against homosexuality, both by thoughtful conservatives and the
public, does not rest solely on the consequential harms, abstract or otherwise,
such behaviour occasions on the individual that engages in homosexual
practices. The case rests, rather, and more starkly, on the behaviour's immorality.
Immoral behaviour, if indulged, makes for immoral people and immoral people

38

D. Kennedy, "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in D. Kairys, ed., The
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make for an immoral civic society. This virtue-based argument is not trivial, and
is not one that liberals can afford to dismiss; in fact inform it is quite sound. If
all adults tomorrow practiced widespread necrophilia, there may be no liberally
understood harms to anyone, but it's quite reasonable to think that as selfregarding as this behaviour may be, there would nevertheless be a more than
discernable deterioration of the quality of our public and private moral lives and
hence of our lives generally understood. The conservative and public case
against homosexuality is parallel, and it needs to be addressed on its own terms.
The opportunity-cost of the negative-liberty argument for gay sex and gay
marriage, then, is simply the cost of the opportunity to argue for the essential
morality of these relationships. This is not an opportunity we can afford to pass
up, in part because the argument is not a terribly difficult one. Like all
committed intimate relationships (and arguably, as suggested above, in some
ways more so than heterosexual relationships), homosexual committed
relationships prompt each participant to care for another, which in turn models
an attitude of care for others. Whether homosexuality results from an orientation
that is biologically or socially determined is of absolutely no consequence to this
claim: a committed intimate relationship between caring partners - whether
same-sex or opposite-sex - is a good thing. It is a good way to live out an adult
life, and a good position for all of us from which to move from private to public
daily life. That these unions do not produce children genetically tied to both
partners may be or may not be of much consequence: they do routinely produce
children genetically tied to one, and the labour investment of the second parent
produces a degree of stability at least comparable to that found in traditional
heterosexual homes. And, that the sexual coupling is not of a "reproductive
type," as argued by the new natural lawyers,39 may have religious significance,
but its secular consequence is either mysterious, ambiguous or nil. I don't mean
to elaborate any of these contentions here. I only wish to point out that the
essentially libertarian argument for gay sex and marriage - that it harms no one
other than the actors, that intervention is paternalistic and that moralism can't
justify legislating against it - mutes them, and unfortunately so. These are not
hard arguments to make, and may well find a larger and more receptive audience
than is commonly believed.
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D. Positive Liberty
I want to elaborate in a bit more detail on one final possible understanding
of the content of the liberty protected by the due process clause, and that is that
what the clause protects is the individual's so-called "positive" liberty to selfmastery. Although a grammatically permissible interpretation of the phrase, the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment might be centrally concerned with
positive liberty - alone of the four positions discussed in this piece - has
received virtually no support from the Supreme Court, and almost none from
commentators. Not only conservatives and liberals, but for the most part
progressive commentators as well, widely assume that the "liberty" protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, if it exists at all, is essentially negative.4" Whatever
the scope of the "liberty" protected, the consensus seems to be that it surely can't
extend so far as to protect our positive liberty. Again, the Court and virtually all
major commentators - conservatives, liberals and progressives alike - are
surprisingly united in this view.
It is, clearly, an important assumption, particularly as regards the relationship
between the Constitution and economic distributions of wealth. If it is true, as
so many either insist or simply assume, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects,
at most, negative liberty, then the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is either hostile to or irrelevant to legislative redistribution aimed
at lessening the inegalitarian impact of markets. Let me take these points in
order. First, if the "negative liberty" protected by the phrase includes economic
liberties, as was argued during the Lochner era, then it is hostile: as was argued
during those decades, legislative redistributions of wealth are impermissible
intrusions on the protected negative liberty to contract freely. Second, if the due
process clause protects not contractual freedom but rather personal, sexual and
familial freedom, as is now held both by liberals and (to a lesser degree) the
modem Court, then it is essentially irrelevant: such liberty would not constitute
an obstacle, but nor would it constitute a vehicle for greater egalitarianism in
contemporary life. In modem discourse, conservatives are now trying to reenliven the Lochner reading, putting the weight of constitutional law and
rhetoric once again squarely behind propertied interests,4 while liberals are
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trying to maintain the integrity of the Roe interpretation4 2 - but both sides are
as one in viewing the Constitution's protection of liberty as a protection of
negative liberty only. But so long as the mainstream argument over the meaning
of liberty is premised on the assumption that whatever its content it must be
negative, the liberty to which the Constitution entitles us will be either
antagonistic to or irrelevant to attacks on class privilege.
However, this widespread and highly consequential assumption, that the
liberty protected by the due process clause must be negative, is in my view
mistaken. Let me return to Isaiah Berlin's influential distinction to make the
point. To repeat, "negative liberty," Berlin argued, by which he meant that which
is involved in the question "What is the area within which the subject ... is or
should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by
other persons?"4' 3 is but one of two primary meanings the ideal has taken over the
course of history. The other meaning - which, according to Berlin, is by far the
more historically dangerous of the two, but which, he is equally clear, is just as
fundamental an historical longing - is liberty in its positive sense, by which he
meant that which is involved in answering the question "What, or who, is the
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this
rather than that?"" The two meanings of liberty, he famously insisted, are quite
different. A good deal of negative liberty is consistent with a deprivation of
positive liberty, and vice versa:4 5
Freedom in [the negative] ... sense is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy
or self-government. ... [T]here is no necessary connexion between individual liberty and
democratic rule. The answer to the question "Who governs me?" is logically distinct from
the question "How far does government interfere with me?" It is in this difference that the
great contrast between the two concept of negative and positive liberty, in the end, consists.
For the "positive" sense of liberty comes to light if we try to answer the question, not
"What am I free to do or be?," but "By whom am I ruled?" or "Who is to say what I am,
and what I am not, to be or do?" The connexion between democracy and individual liberty
is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both. The desire to be
governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be
controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically
older. But it is not a desire for the same thing.

42

Rev. 782; B. Thompson, Jr., "Judicial Takings" (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449.
D. Cruz, "'The Sexual Freedom Cases'? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the

43

Constitution" (2000) 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299.
Supra note 1 at 121-22.

4

45

Ibid. at 122.
Ibid. at 129-131.

Vol. VI, No. 2
Review of ConstitutionalStudies
HeinOnline -- 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 286 2001-2002

Tradition, Principle and Self-Sovereignty

287

If Berlin's general account here is even close to accurate, then the
widespread assumption that the liberty prong of the Fourteenth Amendment as
necessarily concerned with negative liberty, and negative liberty only, is simply
bizarre. Rather, given their history, it is surely at least possible to read the
reconstruction amendments, taken in their entirety, as essentially concerned with
providing a guarantee of positive liberty, and it is equally possible to interpret
each of the Fourteenth Amendment's maj or provisions - the due process clause
and the equal protection clause - in light of that overriding objective. Surely,
it is at least possible to argue that what the Fourteenth Amendment added to the
Constitution was not an ideal of equality at all, but a guarantee that the states and
Congress protect the positive liberty of each citizen, and a mandate that states
and Congress use law to protect that freedom. The point of the Amendment, in
other words, might be liberty, not equality at all - equal protection is the means
by which the goal, liberty, is to be achieved. But liberty is the goal of the
amendment, and understood in the context of the history that produced it, it must
be positive, not negative, liberty that the states are required to protect.
Why positive, not negative liberty? Well, what is positive liberty? Again,
according to Berlin - who not only coined the phrase, but then became its most
severe critic - positive liberty is, simply, the polar opposite of slavery: the selfmastery at the opposite extreme from the state of being enslaved. It is the liberty
to be free of the power over oneself of others. It is the urge to be in a state of
self-mastery. Berlin wrote:46
The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual
to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external
forces of whatever kind. ... I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons,
by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, selfdirected and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an
animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and
policies of my own and realizing them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that

I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest
of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active
being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my
own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved
to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.
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The reconstruction amendments, of course, are there to ensure the political
and moral victories won in the civil war, central to which was the abolition of
slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, clearly forbids more than slavery
per se. Not only must the states not permit slavery, but they must also not
deprive the citizen of liberty. What does that add if not simply a measure of
negative liberty? Surely it is possible that what it means for the state to be
required to not deny liberty is that the state must not only police against actual
enslavement but must guarantee legal protection for this condition of selfmastery.
It remains an open question, of course, what sorts of conditions constitute
such a state of servitude as to deprive a citizen of an entitlement to positive
liberty. Again, though, it should surely be possible to argue that economic
oppression constitutes a sort of economic servitude or, put positively, that some
minimal degree of economic power is a necessary condition of the self-mastery
central to the liberty of which we are guaranteed. At least, it has been the
common ground of advocates of private property, from Adam Smith to Jack
Kemp, that the answer to both questions is clearly yes. If so, then the Fourteenth
Amendment speaks rather directly to economic slavery: it's unconstitutional.
Finally, this reading has the added virtue of suggesting a reading of the equal
protection clause that is both more logical and historically grounded than any of
the various readings current today: the point of the equal protection clause, on
this approach, is not equality- equal is in the clause as a modifier, not a noun
- but protection.4 7 For the state to fail to protect a class of persons against the
aggression of another class is, in effect, to permit the first group to be enslaved
by the other - should the state deprive the first of the protections of the criminal
law, for example, the first would be at the mercy of- they would be subject to
the whims of - the second group, who would thereby become, in effect,
sovereigns over them. That is a perfectly adequate definition of a relationship of
slavery- the slave owner is not subject to the sanctions of the criminal law in
his relations with the slave. The state, then, is required to provide such "equal
protection" of law. This interpretation too leaves open an important issue, and
that is "protection against what?" Violation of natural rights would have been the
eighteenth- as well as nineteenth-century answer to such a question, but today
we have to answer it pragmatically. Clearly, protection against violent assault is
included - again, that echoes the historic purpose of the Amendment. By
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analogy, protection against economic exploitation might be a logical extension.
All I want to suggest here, however, is that if we take seriously the account of
positive liberty described in a seminal essay by a modem philosopher who was
one of that ideal's harshest critics, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
the Fourteenth Amendment, no less than the Thirteenth and Fifteenth, was aimed
at protecting positive, not negative, liberty. The Amendment guarantees, on this
reading, the power to be master of one's self, rather than an illusory sphere of
"self-regarding" and unimpeded action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Where does this leave us? Liberty jurisprudence will continue to play some
role in American life, so long as abortion, and perhaps euthanasia and
homosexuality as well, continue to divide us. Beyond those questions, however,
it's not clear that the essentially negative conception of liberty that has animated
the "due process" revival we have witnessed in the last thirty years will greatly
impact upon our political process. And even questions surrounding euthanasia
laws and homosexuality, if recent case-law is any guide, are more likely to be
resolved under the equal protection clause than as questions of liberty. Outside
of the troubling terrain of abortion laws, then, "liberty" may be in danger of
becoming a dead letter so long as we insist, as the Court insists, on its essential
negativity.
And, whether the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment will play
any kind of a role in our economic lives, is even less clear. It is unlikely that this
or any future Court will revisit the regressive and libertarian doctrine of the
Lochner days. It is (at least) equally unlikely, however, that this or any future
Court will open an inquiry into the possible positive understandings of that
nebulous guarantee. Surely, the constitutional text, and arguably its history,
could support a more positive and potentially more transformative understanding
of liberty - one which would directly speak, for example, among much else, to
conditions of'"economic servitude," ofun- and under-employment, of workplace
conditions and severe impoverishment. Again, if the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is understood in a "positive" sense, then such a result
should be unproblematic: if the Constitution protects our right of "self-mastery"
then there are quite real constitutional constraints on the income disparities and
power differentials that the markets generated by the negative freedom of
individuals might produce.

2002
Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles
HeinOnline -- 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 289 2001-2002

290

Robin West

Such a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is not likely to
emanate from this Supreme Court, and possibly from any Court, and not only for
crass political reasons. Rather, the social and economic upheaval such a reading
would require may well be beyond the powers and jurisprudential selfunderstanding of thejudicial branch of government. It does not follow, however,
that such a reading is wrong. What follows is that such a reading, if right, must
emanate from state, local and national representatives prepared to act on it, and
must originate from, as well as ultimately be heard by, a citizenry that embraces
not only the conception ofrights it entails, but the correlative conception of civic
responsibility on which it rests. For a positive understanding of the liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution, in other words, to "take root" and "bear fruit,"
would require notjust a reinterpretation of our constitutional norms - although
it would certainly require that. It would require a transformation of our civic
heart as well. Only with such a transformation might a positive interpretation of
liberty be read as an integral, rather than anomalous part of our collective selfunderstanding, and of our aspirational, albeit contradictory, defining document.

Vol. VI, No. 2
Review of ConstitutionalStudies
HeinOnline -- 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 290 2001-2002

